



TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT WIEN Vienna University of Technology

## Improved Redundancy and Consistency beyond RAID-1

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### Agenda

- 1. Introduction
- 2. Safe Storage
- 3. Implementation
- 4. Evaluation
- 5. Conclusion

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Introduction Background RAID-1

# Part I

## Introduction

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#### Introduction

Background

RAID-1

### Background of this work

- Part of the thesis "Linux in safety-critical applications"
- Can we trust the way Linux (and FLOSS) is developed and tested
- LTP<sup>1</sup> was looking for RAID tests

<sup>1</sup>Linux Test Project (http://ltp.sf.net)

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### Introduction

Background RAID-1  RAID: Redundant Array of Inexpensive/Independent Disks

- Different RAID levels (e.g.):
  - RAID-0: striping


How does it work?

- RAID-1: mirroring
- RAID-1 creates virtual hard disk
- Data written to virtual disk is mirrored to multiple physical disks
- If one disk fails, whole system is still operational

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Introduction Background RAID-1

### How to test it?




- Separate test environment from system under test
- Physically switch on/off hard disks
- Use cryptographic hashes to verify consistent state of files on the disk
- Linux software RAID has proven to be very stable

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Introduction Background RAID-1

### What are the problems?

- In general RAID-1 improves availability, but availability of storage can be part of the safety argumentation
- Consistency checks:



- Important properties are missing that qualify RAID-1 as safe storage.
- ► ⇒ RAID-1 like behaviour is fine, but additional properties are necessary

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Safe Storage Definition Requirements

# Part II

# Safe Storage

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Safe Storage

Definition

Requirements

### What is safe storage

Informal definition:

Storage is considered to be safe, if it provides a high degree of confidence that raw data that is read is exactly the same as the raw data that was written to it.

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Safe Storage

Requirements

### Consistency

- Safe storage needs much stronger concept of consistency checking than standard RAID-1
- Whenever the safe storage detects an inconsistent state (e.g., a bit flip) it has to inform the reading application
- Of utmost importance for safety critical applications. If they are informed, a safe-state can be reached.

Diversity

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Safe Storage

- Definition
- Requirements

 File system development is a difficult task. Modern file systems are getting more complex.

File System	Lines of Code	Open Bugs <sup>2</sup>
ext2	8965	4
ext3	16362	15
ext4	33979	45
xfs	74503	8
btrfs	57088	43

- Safe storage can benefit from the diversity in the file system sector
- Would be impossible to achieve in hardware (e.g., one file system on RAID-1 disk set)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>http://bugzilla.kernel.org

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Safe Storage Definition

Requirements

### On-the-fly correction

- According to literature there is a large number of Undetected Disk Errors (UDEs).
- Use consistency and redundancy as a prerequisite
- Overwrite faulty copies on-the-fly with an agreed, consistent state (e.g., TMR + voting)

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Safe Storage Definition

Requirements

## Simplicity

- As we have seen from the lines of code, file system development is a complex matter
- Implementation of safe storage should not introduce unnecessary complexity by itself
- $ightarrow \Rightarrow$  a simple layer above existing file systems

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#### Implementation

Tools

Tinysafefs

Two Disk Mode

Three Disk Mode

# Part III

## Implementation

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#### Implementation

Tools

Tinysafefs

Two Disk Mode

Three Disk Mode

## Tools of the trade - FLOSS software

### Linux:

- Widely used
- A lot of different file systems which are proven in use
- Necessary design diversity (different programmes, different companies)

### FUSE:

- Upstream and used by many projects (sshfs, ntfs-3g,...)
- Really nice for rapid prototyping of crazy ideas

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#### Implementation

Tools

Tinysafefs

Two Disk Mode Three Disk Mode Tinysafefs

- Wrapper file system around existing file systems
- Has its own mount point (e.g., /mnt/tinysafefs)
- Reads/Writes data from/to existing mountpoints which should be the mointpoints of physical disks with distinct file systems

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#### Implementation

Tools

Tinysafefs

Two Disk Mode

Three Disk Mode

## Two Disk Mode

- Simple "lowcost" version
- Similar to RAID-1, but with consistency checks (and file system diversity)
- On write: Data gets written to two mount points (i.e., two disks)
- On read: Data is read from both disks, gets compared and if (and only if) consistent gets forwarded to reading application
- If data not consistent: Return ENOENT (No such file or directory)

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#### Implementation

Tools

Tinysafefs

Two Disk Mode

Three Disk Mode

## Two Disk Mode (2)

\$ cd /tmp/tinysafefs
\$ ls
testfile.txt
\$ ls /disk\*/

/disk1:

testfile.txt

```
/disk2:
   testfile.txt
$ mkdir testdir
$ ls
   testfile.txt
   testdir
$ ls /disk*/
   /disk1:
   testfile.txt
   testdir
/disk2:
```

testfile.txt testdir

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#### Implementation

Tools

Tinysafefs

Two Disk Mode

Three Disk Mode

## Two Disk Mode (3)

```
$ cd /tmp/tinysafefs
$ echo "testdata" > ./testfile.txt
$ ls /disk*
  /disk1:
  testfile.txt
  /disk2:
  testfile.txt
$ cat ./testfile.txt
  testdata
$ echo "destroy it" > /disk1/testfile.txt
$ cat ./testfile.txt
  cat: ./testfile.txt: No such file or directory
```

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#### Implementation

Tools

Tinysafefs

Two Disk Mode

Three Disk Mode

### Three Disk Mode

- Wrapped around three disks
- On write: data is written to three disks
- On read: data is read from all copies and consistency gets checked
  - If at least two copies have a consistent state, data gets forwarded to user space application
  - If one copy is inconsistent, tinysafefs tries to overwrite it
  - If all copies are inconsistent: ENOENT

```
Improved
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```

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```
Implementation
```

Tools

Tinvsafefs

Two Disk Mode

Three Disk Mode

```
Three Disk Mode (2)
 $ cd /tmp/tinysafefs
 $ echo "testdata" > ./testfile.txt
 $ ls /disk*
   /disk1:
   testfile.txt
   /disk2:
   testfile.txt
   /disk3:
   testfile.txt
 $ cat ./testfile.txt
   testdata
 $ echo "destroy it" > /disk1/testfile.txt
 $ cat ./testfile.txt
   testdata
 $ cat /disk1/testfile.txt
   testdata
 $ echo "destroy it 1" > /disk1/testfile.txt
 $ echo "destroy it 2" > /disk2/testfile.txt
 $ cat ./testfile.txt
   cat: ./testfile.txt: No such file or directory
```

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#### Evaluation

Setup Performance Correction

# Part IV

## **Evaluation**

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#### Evaluation

- Setup
- Performance
- Correction

### **Evaluation Setup**

### Hardware:

- Standard PC with Ubuntu Server 10.04.1
- One disk with the OS, 3 usb drives with ext2, ext4, xfs
- Used for performance tests and selected scenarios

### Software:

- Simulator written in Python
- Simulates three disk mode with on-the-fly correction
- Worst/Best case scenarios (and randomly selected cases) used for hardware evaluation

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#### Evaluation

Setup

Performance

Correction

### Performance of tinysafefs

- dd with fsync
- Caches were dropped after each run to minimize cache influence
- Block sizes from 128 bytes to 8192 bytes.



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#### Evaluation

Setup

Performance

Correction

#### MB/s Block Size (in Bytes)

Read performance of tinysafefs - 3 disk mode



### Figure: Read performance




Figure: Write performance

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#### Evaluation

Setup

Performance

Correction

## Corrections of tinysafefs in 3 disk mode

- Hard to assume realistic numbers of failures per read.
   Assumption: 1 failure per 50 reads
- 1000 runs  $\Rightarrow$  1000 seeds for random generator
- 100 files per run
- After 50 reads, 1 random file on one random disk gets destroyed.

### Read until first uncorrectable fault

Until First Error	TDMC	Single Disk	Factor
Min. Repairs	0	None	-
Max. Repairs	849	None	-
Min. Reads	103	51	2.0
Max. Reads	42861	299	143.3
Overall Reads	5317517	117697	45.1
Overall Repairs	102033	None	-
Average Reads	5317	117	45.4
Average Repairs	102	None	-

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Conclusion

# Part V

## Conclusion

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Conclusion

### Lessons learned

- Safe storage can be implemented by means of consistency, diversity, on-the-fly correction, and simplicity
- Safety critical systems can benefit from FLOSS
  - All the tools are already there
  - Trust is put on software that can be reviewed (no binary-blob firmware)

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Conclusion

### ETX and EOT

### Thank you for your attention!